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ABSTRACT
One of the most remarkable phenomena in current international politics is the increasing 
attention paid to “historical injustice.” Opinions on this phenomenon strongly differ. For 
some it stands for a new and noble type of politics based on raised moral standards and 
helping the cause of peace and democracy. Others are more critical and claim that retro-
spective politics comes at the cost of present- or future-oriented politics and tends to be 
anti-utopian. 
The warnings about the perils of a retrospective politics outweighing politics directed at 
contemporary injustices, or strivings for a more just future, should be taken seriously. Yet 
the alternative of a politics disregarding all historical injustice is not desirable either. We 
should refuse to choose between restitution for historical injustices and struggle for justice 
in the present or the future. Rather, we should look for types of retrospective politics that 
do not oppose but complement or reinforce the emancipatory and utopian elements in 
present- and future-directed politics.
I argue that retrospective politics can indeed have negative effects. Most notably it can 
lead to a “temporal Manichaeism” that not only posits that the past is evil, but also tends to 
treat evil as anachronistic or as belonging to the past. Yet I claim that ethical Manichaeism 
and anti-utopianism and are not inherent features of all retrospective politics but rather 
result from an underlying philosophy of history that treats the relation between past, pres-
ent, and future in antinomic terms and prevents us from understanding “transtemporal” 
injustices and responsibilities.
In order to pinpoint the problem of certain types of retrospective politics and point 
toward some alternatives, I start out from a criticism formulated by the German phi-
losopher Odo Marquard and originally directed primarily at progressivist philosophies of 
history.
Keywords: historical injustice, transitional justice, retrospective politics, post-histoire, 
politics of time, progress, ethics
“If we can reframe our history to include both perpetrators and vic-
tims as victims of the ultimate perpetrator—namely, the conflict of 
the past, we will have fully achieved unity and reconciliation. . . .”2
1. I would like to thank Egon Bauwelinck, Tessa Boeykens, Lore Colaert, Antoon De Baets, 
Hannah Franzki, Lucian Hölscher, Pieter Lagrou, Gisele Iecker de Almeida, Chris Lorenz, Gabrielle 
Spiegel, Kenan Van De Mieroop, and Chiel van den Akker for their stimulating comments and cri-
tiques, which greatly helped me in writing this article.
2. Commissioner Wynand Malan in his minority position in: South African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, Final Report (Cape Town, 1998), V, 443.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable current political phenomena is undoubtedly the 
increasing international attention paid to recent and less recent “historical injus-
tices.” Since the early 1990s we have seen the rise of an impressive number of 
different initiatives that address all kinds of historical evils, ranging from primar-
ily (though not solely) symbolic acts such as memorialization programs, truth 
commissions, and public apologies, to more practical political measures such as 
reparation payments and historical redress, to straightforward judicial prosecu-
tions through tribunals and (inter)national courts. Some of these initiatives are 
well-known or have even become thoroughly iconic: think, for example, of the 
restitution to victims of the Holocaust, the prosecution of war criminals, public 
apologies to indigenous peoples by (former) colonial powers, the ongoing debate 
on reparations for slavery, and so on.3 
Along with numerous less-known cases, these historical-justice initiatives 
have become the central focus of intense intellectual discussions both within and 
outside the academic sphere. Most commentators agree that the initiatives thor-
oughly characterize contemporary international politics, and several labels have 
been coined to describe approximately the same phenomenon: some speak about 
the rise of “historical justice,”4 others about “politics of regret,”5 and still others 
about “reparation politics,”6 or as I will do here, “retrospective politics.” 
When it comes to assessing the precise political, sociocultural, or ethical 
meaning of the focus on historical injustice and the rise of retrospective politics, 
however, opinions strongly differ. For some, the phenomenon represents a new 
and noble type of politics that strives for higher moral standards, breaks with 
the realpolitik of the past, and helps the cause of justice, peace, and democracy. 
According to Tuomas Forsberg, the idea that we cannot simply leave the past 
behind but must carry the burden of history represents a genuine “cultural turn” in 
political science.7 The Nigerian Nobel Prizewinner Wole Soyinka speaks about a 
“fin de millénaire fever of atonement” and praises (certain) reparation initiatives 
as offering possibilities for a symbolic new beginning or even a “Global Annul-
ment” of debts and historical injustices. “Reparations,” Soyinka claims, “serve as 
a cogent critique of history and thus a potent restraint of its repetition.”8 Elazar 
Barkan, one of the most optimistic spokesmen in the field of transitional justice, 
3. For a good overview of these kinds of initiatives, see Dinah Shelton, “The World of Atonement: 
Reparations for Historical Injustices,” Miskolc Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (2004), 259-289.
4. Ruti Teitel, Transitional justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
5. Jeffrey Olick, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (New 
York: Routledge, 2007).
6. John Torpey, Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparation Politics (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
7. Tuomas Forsberg, “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual 
and Normative Issues,” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict. 
Expanded and updated, ed. Nigel Biggar (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 58.
8. Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 83.
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even claims that the increased international sensibility to the need for restitution 
to “past victims” and the “willingness of nations to embrace their own guilt” 
since the 1990s represents nothing less than the rise of a “new globalism” based 
on an “expanded international moral standard” or even a “neo-enlightenment 
morality.”9 
Yet not everybody shares the optimism of people like Soyinka and Barkan. 
Some commentators claim that retrospective politics often comes at the cost of 
present and future oriented politics or argue that it tends to be anti-utopian and 
can therefore hardly be called emancipatory. One of the best-known defenders of 
this argument is John Torpey, who laments that “‘coming to terms with the past’ 
in contemporary politics has extensively supplanted the elaboration of visions 
of the future.”10 Reparations politics, he argues, is often merely a tactical move 
that characterizes a historical era that is no longer capable of offering “inclusive 
visions of progressive change,” as, for example, represented by socialism or the 
American civil rights movement. Sadly, Torpey remarks, the only road to the 
future in contemporary politics seems to run via the long detour of the disasters 
of the past.11 
Torpey is certainly not the only intellectual expressing these worries. Accord-
ing to historian Pieter Lagrou, “our contemporary societies, for lack of future 
projects, shrink into a ‘passeist’ culture.”12 In European public discourse, he 
argues, the focus on crimes of the distant past has become so strong that it tends 
to marginalize claims of victims of contemporary crimes and human rights vio-
lations. Therefore, Lagrou argues, “a commemorative discourse of victimhood 
is very much the opposite of a constructive and dynamic engagement with the 
present, but rather a paralyzing regression of democratic debate.”13 Lagrou’s 
argument closely resembles many others that turn against retrospective politics 
and “victim culture” such as Ian Buruma’s warning about the peril of minorities 
defining themselves exclusively as historical victims and engaging in an “Olym-
pics of suffering”14 and Charles Maier’s claims about a “surfeit of memory.”15
9. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Balti-
more: John Hopkins University Press, 2000), and Elazar Barkan, “Restitution and Amending Histori-
cal Injustices in International Morality,” in Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustice, 
ed. J. Torpey (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 91-102. 
10. John Torpey, “Introduction,” in Torpey, ed., Politics and the Past, 1.
11. John Torpey, “Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: Reflections on Reparations,” Journal 
of Modern History 73, no. 2 (2001), 333-358. 
12. Pieter Lagrou, “De l’histoire du temps présent à l’histoire des autres: Comment une discipline 
critique devint complaisante,” Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’histoire 118 (2013), 117. [My translation]
13. Pieter Lagrou, “Europe as a Place for Common Memories? Some Thoughts on Victimhood, 
Identity and Emancipation from the Past,” in Clashes in European Memory: The Case of Communist 
Repression and the Holocaust, ed. Muriel Blaive, Christian Gerbel, and Thomas Lindenberger (Inns-
bruck: Studien Verlag, 2011), 283. 
14. Ian Buruma, “The Joys and Perils of Victimhood,” The New York Review of Books, April 8 
(1999), 2. See also Jie-Hyun Lim, “Towards a Transnational History of Victimhood Nationalism: 
On the Trans-Pacific Space,” in The Trans-Pacific Imagination: Rethinking Boundary, Culture and 
Society, ed. Naoki Sakaj and Hyon Joo Yoo (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012), 45-60.
15. Charles Maier, “A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy, and Denial,” His-
tory and Memory 5, no. 2 (1993), 1936-1951.
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These warnings about the perils of a retrospective politics outweighing or even 
banning politics directed at contemporary injustices or striving for a more just 
future should be taken seriously. Yet the alternative of an exclusively present- or 
future-oriented politics disregarding all historical injustice is not desirable either. 
Contemporary injustice often manifests itself in the form of structural repetition 
or continuity of injustices with a long history. Moreover, totalitarian versions of 
progressivist politics have frequently abused the idea of a struggle for a more 
just future in order to justify past and present suffering. It could even be argued 
that the rise of dominant restrospective politics has been initiated partly on the 
basis of disillusionment with the exculpatory mechanisms of progressivist ide-
ology.16 Some indeed claim that much of present-day retrospective politics and 
the “setting straight” of historical injustices would be unnecessary had totalitar-
ian progressivist politics focused less exclusively on the bright future and shown 
more sensitivity to the contemporary suffering of its day. This claim certainly 
makes sense if one thinks of extreme examples such as Stalin’s five-year plans 
and Mao’s Great Leap Forward. Yet, as Matthias Frisch rightly argues, the risk 
of the justification of past and present suffering lurks around the corner wherever 
progressive logics of history or promises of bright and just futures are not coun-
terbalanced by reflective forms of remembrance.17 
Therefore, we should resist dualist thinking that forces us to choose between 
restitution for historical injustices and struggle for justice in the present or the 
future. Rather, we should look for types of retrospective politics that do not 
oppose but complement or reinforce the emancipatory and utopian elements in 
present- and future-directed politics—and the other way around: present- and 
future-oriented politics that do not forget about historical injustices. 
In this paper I want to contribute to this goal by focusing on the issue of 
retrospective politics and by analyzing how one can differentiate emancipatory 
or even utopian types of retrospective politics from retrospective politics that 
I classify here as anti-utopian. I argue that the currently dominant strands of 
retrospective politics indeed do tend to be anti-utopian and have a very limited 
emancipatory potential. Moreover, I claim that currently dominant retrospec-
tive politics do not radically break with several of the exculpatory intellectual 
mechanisms that are typically associated with progressivist politics but actually 
modify and sometimes even radicalize them. In that restricted sense, and only in 
this sense, it can be argued that currently dominant retrospective politics do not 
represent a fundamentally new way of dealing with historical evil and the ethics 
of responsibility. 
16. Thinkers such as Antoon De Baets and Samuel Moyn have also made this type of argument 
for human rights discourse in general. See, for example, Antoon De Baets, “A Successful Utopia: The 
Doctrine of Human Dignity,” Historein: A Review of the Past and Other Stories 7 (2007), 71-85, and 
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2010). 
17. Matthias Fritsch, The Promise of Memory: History and Politics in Marx, Benjamin, and Der-
rida (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 4. As Fritsch explains, this insight into the 
dangers of totalitarian versions of progressive politics formed an often overlooked background of 
Walter Benjamin’s criticism of orthodox Marxism. See also Martin Woessner, “Reconsidering the 
Slaughter Bench of History: Genocide, Theodicy, and the Philosophy of History” Journal of Geno-
cide Research 13, no. 1/2 (2011), 85-105.
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My perspective is not a pessimistic one, however. Besides the currently domi-
nant retrospective politics, there exist other strands of retrospective politics that 
do have emancipatory or even utopian features and that do not force us to choose 
between restitution for historical injustices and struggle for justice in the present 
or the future. Anti-utopianism and ethical “passeism,” I argue, are not inherent 
or necessary features of all retrospective politics but rather result from a specific, 
underlying type of historical thought or philosophy of history18 that treats the 
relation between past, present, and future in antinomic terms and prevents us 
from understanding “transtemporal” injustices and responsibilities. Sometimes 
this type of historical thought indeed stimulates a moralistic stance in which the 
past is charged with the worst of all evil, while the present becomes morally dis-
charged by simple comparison. The latter type of “temporal Manichaeism” can 
be highly problematic, I argue, because it not only posits that the “past is evil” 
but also tends to turn this reasoning around and stimulates the wishful thought 
that “evil is past.” 
In order to analyze and evaluate the philosophy of history underlying currently 
dominant retrospective politics, I will first make an intellectual detour and start 
with an analysis of the philosophy of history that is typically associated with pro-
gressivist politics. In this paper I focus on an analysis by the German philosopher 
Odo Marquard. This “detour” is rewarding because it helps us pinpoint what the 
problem is with certain types of retrospective politics and how they can foreclose 
other forms of politics or justice. Reading the work of Marquard will also help 
us critically reassess the relation between classical progressivist politics and cur-
rently dominant retrospective politics. 
In order to show that other more emancipatory types of retrospective politics 
exist, I will end this article with a brief discussion of some alternative visions 
of politics and justice, based on radically different notions of historicity, which 
have been developed by victim and survivor collectives such as the Argentine 
Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo and the South African Khulumani Support 
Group. 
ODO MARQUARD ON THE GENESIS AND PARADOXES OF  
PROGRESSIVIST PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
The problem with progressivist philosophies of history according to Odo Mar-
quard is that they tend to function as “secular theodicies,” that is, secular versions 
of the old theological tradition of attempting to explain and justify the existence 
of evil in the world. Progressivist philosophies of history can be abused to 
absolve people of their responsibilities for historical evil and even to justify past 
and present suffering and terror. To explain why and how progressivist philoso-
phies of history tend to turn into theodicy-like exculpatory discourses or tend 
to create an effect of moral unburdening (Entlastung), Marquard turns to their 
18. By “philosophy of history” I am not referring to the philosophy or theory underpinning the 
work of professional historians. Rather, I am using the concept to refer to often widespread sets of 
(implicit or explicit) ideas about the process of history and the structure of historical time. 
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historical genesis, which he himself describes in the form of a “grand narrative”-
style philosophy of history—an irony of which he seems well aware.19 
According to Marquard, it is not a coincidence that modern philosophy of his-
tory—a term coined by Voltaire—came into existence around the mid-eighteenth 
century. The middle of the eighteenth century, according to Marquard, was an age 
characterized by an increased perception of evil in the world and an increasing 
failure of theological explanations for this evil. It is exactly this fatal combination 
that gave birth to modern philosophy of history.20 
Still, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
had launched an influential, optimistic theological explanation for the existence 
of evil by claiming that all may not be good in the world, but that God created 
the best of possible worlds. Leibniz’s theodicy—he invented the term around 
171021—was an ingenious attempt to refute skeptical interpretations of the value 
of Creation and to defend God from being held responsible for the existence of 
evil in his Creation or at least for not putting an end to this evil.22 
Leibniz’s optimistic answer (Creation is the best possible one; it is optimal) 
may have been convincing to some for some time, but by the middle of the eigh-
teenth century it had become increasingly unconvincing. The crisis of Leibniz’s 
optimistic theodicy, according to Marquard, was provoked primarily by the 
occurrence of a series of historical calamities of which the catastrophic earth-
quake of Lisbon in 1755—with its ten thousands of deaths—was doubtlessly the 
best-known and most influential.23 
In the face of evils such as the Lisbon catastrophe, no optimistic theodicy 
could be convincing. The problem of such a radical evil demanded a more radi-
cal answer that ultimately transcended the limits of theistic theodicy: the only 
way to convincingly unburden God of being held responsible for evils of this 
magnitude was to separate him from his Creation or even to declare his nonexis-
tence. Marquard speaks about “Atheismus ad maiorem Dei gloriam”—“Atheism 
for the greater glory of God”24—and he claims that this process of theological 
19. Marquard’s insight into this ironic paradox is clearly indicated by the title of one of his central 
articles on the subject: Odo Marquard, “Beitrag zur Philosophie der Geschichte des Abschieds von 
der Philosophie der Geschichte,” in Geschichte, Ereignis und Erzählung, ed. R. Koselleck and W. D. 
Stempel (Muich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), 241-250.
20. Odo Marquard, “Die Krise des Optimismus und die Geburt der Geschichtsphilosophie,” in Odo 
Marquard, Skepsis in der Moderne (Stuttgart, Reclam, 2007), 93. 
21. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme, et 
l’origine du mal. https://archive.org/details/essaisdetheodic00jaucgoog (accessed February 20, 2015).
22. It is well known that this theological problem has long plagued Christianity, which as a mono-
theistic religion has to answer the question why its good God allows the reign of evil in his creation. 
Despite the fact that “theodicy motives” have a long history in theological discussions, Marquard 
claims that full-blown theodicies are typically a modern phenomenon. He provocatively states that 
“where there is theodicy, there is modernity, and where there is modernity, there is theodicy.” Odo 
Marquard, In Defense of the Accidental (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 11.
23. To illustrate how this earthquake influenced the crisis of optimism, Marquard qoutes from 
Voltaire’s “Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne,” and to stress the magnitude of its impact on con-
temporary intellectual life he cites Susan Neiman’s claim that the name “Lisbon” meant for those 
living in the eighteenth century what the name “Auschwitz” means to us. Marquard, “Die Krise des 
Optimismus und die Geburt der Geschichtsphilosophie,” 97.
24. Odo Marquard, Schwierigheiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie [1973] (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), 70.
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radicalization provoked the birth or at least breakthrough of secular philosophy of 
history. If certain intellectuals around the mid-eighteenth century started to assert 
humanity’s autonomy (rather than its heteronomy in the hands of God) and posit 
its ability to make history (what Marquard aptly calls the “Vico thesis”), it was 
in order to protect the glory of God from being tainted by the accusation of his 
responsibility for the existence of evil.25 
The thesis that the rise of secular philosophy of history is the product of inter-
nal Christian theological “defects” has great implications for our interpretation 
of the former intellectual system and its claim about human autonomy.26 By 
positing that humans make their own history, secular philosophy of history also 
makes them the “perpetrator[s] of history” [Geschichtstäter], including its evil 
and injustice—precisely the position that God had to be rescued from. “Human-
ity” inherits the position of the accused in the great philosophical “tribunal” about 
the existence of evil. This miserable starting position explains why philosophy of 
history soon develops its own (post-theist or secular) “theodicy motives,” which 
should help “humanity” to unburden itself from its newly inherited historical 
responsibilities. 
Marquard identifies several theodicy motives or exculpatory mechanisms in 
modern philosophy of history. The most important ones are the assertion of a spe-
cific notion of historical antagonism (what Marquard calls the Gegner Prinzip) 
and a specific temporal logic (historical progress). Taken together, the latter 
should ideally render (a part of) humanity morally “unindictable” for historical 
evil or at least provide it with the alibi of what Marquard calls Ohnmachtsgaran-
tie (guarantee of impotence)—the alibi that one cannot be held responsible for the 
evil if one lacked the power to prevent or stop it. 
The most obvious way to escape the accusation of being the perpetrator of evil 
and injustice is by identifying another perpetrator who is responsible for doing 
evil or for not setting it straight. If one does not want to “relapse” into accusing 
God or to promote “nature” to the role of “perpetrator of history”—as is all too 
often done, according to Marquard—this new perpetrator clearly has to be found 
in the immanent realm of the human. In their search for another perpetrator, 
Marquard argues, philosophers of history discovered the figure of the historical 
adversary (“den Gegner”): for example, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie. To be 
sure, not every adversary can deliver an Ohnmachtsgarantie that absolves true 
humanity (for example, proletarians) from the burden of being responsible for 
25. Marquard here turns around a more conventional analysis that interprets the philosophical 
assertion of human autonomy as one of the causes of the rise of atheism. See Mark Larrimore, 
“Autonomy and the Invention of Theodicy,” in New Essays on the History of Autonomy: A Collection 
Honoring J. B. Schneewind, ed, Natalie Brender and Larry Krasnoff (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 61-91.
26. Marquard does not posit the existence of a substantial historical continuity between Christian 
theology and secular philosophy of history in terms of their content, as, for example, Karl Löwith does 
in his much better known secularization thesis. Rather, he takes his inspiration from Hans Blumen-
berg’s “functional model of history” [Funktionsmodell der Geschichte] in which historical continuity 
is situated in historically recurring “functions” that can be fulfilled by a great variety of intellectual 
systems with potentially very different (cultural, theological, and so on) content. In the case of the 
philosophies of history Marquard criticized, the recurring function is that of providing an answer to 
the age-old question of the reason for the existence of evil. 
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the existence of evil in the world: only the adversary that was and is dominant, 
and reigned and still reigns supreme, can fulfill this function. As Marquard puts 
it: “in its search for exemption [Entlastung], philosophy of history needs the still 
unbroken dominion of the adversaries as its a priori.”27
The best way to keep a ray of hope is to represent human history as a progres-
sive one in which a problematic past and present contrast with a good future. 
As a theodicy motive, the process of history itself—defined as a progression 
(ein Vorgang) in which some things are already done and others are still to be 
done28—offers great possibilities. More precisely, this is history in the form of 
a struggle between those who have done and are responsible for what is done, 
and those who will do and will be responsible for what still is to be done. As 
Marquard puts it, history can be used as a “procedure” to create a moral “divi-
sion of labor” in which one group of people (that is, progressivist philosophers of 
history) posits itself as an avant-garde of the bright future and which as a sort of 
historical prosecutor is legitimated to indict the rest of humanity as a reactionary 
force that is responsible for the evils of the past and present.29 
Yet it is clear that this arrangement to morally unburden one part of human-
ity by overburdening another is a dubious one, and that the radical, “neo-Man-
ichaeist” split between absolute victims/oppressed and absolute perpetrators/
rulers or an evil past/present versus a good and bright future is untenable. There-
fore Marquard proposes a departure (Abschied) from this type of philosophy of 
history in the name of a new moderate philosophy of history that takes human 
“half-heartedness” as its model and sees humanity neither as absolute perpetrator 
nor as absolute victim of history.30 
THE TRIUMPHALISM OF POST-1989 RETROSPECTIVE POLITICS
Although Marquard, as far as I know, never explicitly discussed the subject, his 
plea for a departure from (progressivist) philosophy of history with its search for 
a moral “unindictability” and an alibi of impotence (Ohnmachtsgarantie) through 
an adversarial logic (Gegnerprinzip) and a neo-Manichaeist logic of histori-
cal time at first sight seems to have been realized with the rise of retrospective 
politics around the late 1980s and early 1990s. The rise of retrospective politics 
could be interpreted as a sign that “humanity,” or at least the “international com-
munity,” finally acknowledges that “making history” comes with responsibilities 
and that it can no longer be pretended that only the adversaries are responsible 
for evil and historical injustice in the world. This is indeed how its supporters 
have often presented the rise of retrospective politics. Yet I will argue that this 
interpretation is misleading and that it becomes unconvincing once one takes a 
27. Marquard, “Beitrag zur Philosophie der Geschichte,” 245 (my translation).
28. Ibid., 244 (my translation).
29. Odo Marquard, Farewell to Matters of Principle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
54; see also Marquard, “Die Krise des Optimismus,” 105. 
30. Together with the departure from this type of progressivist philosophy of history, Marquard 
argues for a simultaneous rejection of forms of anthropology-criticism that posit (human) nature as 
the timeless source of evil.
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closer look at the ethico-political mechanisms that underpin currently dominant 
retrospective politics. 
Retrospective policies, such as reparations and memorial programs or the issu-
ing of public apologies, are often related to moral impulses or raised moral stan-
dards. For Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, for example, the international 
rise of the practice of “public moral apology” and the broader tendency to “take 
(past) wrongs seriously” should be explained as direct results of a developing 
“moral consensus” about human rights and, as a logical implication, a consensus 
that violations of human rights should not have taken place in the past either. “To 
apologize,” they claim, “is to accept responsibility for wrongdoing, to morally 
acknowledge the dignity and moral worth of victims, and to commit oneself to 
moral reform and practical amends.”31
This moral interpretation is typically supported by highlighting the timing of 
the rise of retrospective politics, which is often believed to coincide with the end 
of the Cold War that allegedly freed many nations from their hardened adversar-
ial logics and increased their willingness to acknowledge their own guilt.32 This 
explanation is, for example, given by Elazar Barkan, who claims that the funda-
mental innovation of post-Cold War retrospective politics is that it is based on a 
voluntary “embrace” of guilt by ex-perpetrators: “In a post-Cold War world we 
tend to pay increased attention to moral responsibility, but we do it out of choice, 
not necessity.”33 Barkan calls this widespread recognition of moral responsibility 
a “neo-Enlightenment morality” because it is based on rational insight, namely 
a raised and democratized historical consciousness. As he puts it: “As victorious 
histories of the elite and the rich are replaced by the lives of the conquered, the 
poor, and the victimized other, the public is confronted by history as the terri-
tory of injustice. In the democratization of historical memory, the public over 
time encounters its own identity, one that includes immoral acts, suffering, and 
oppression.”34 Another rational source for the rise of neo-Enlightenment moral-
ity is the growing insight that retrospective politics can serve “life” through its 
embrace of healing and reconciliation.
A similar stress on raised moral standards, overcoming of adversarial logics, 
and acknowledgment of historical guilt is often found in the broader field of 
transitional justice. A central feature of transitional justice’s self-representation 
is that it contrasts its own concept of justice with that of “victor’s justice,” and 
sometimes even of retributive justice in general (as, for example, represented 
31. Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, “Taking Wrongs Seriously: A Qualified Defence of 
Public Apologies,” Saskatchewan Law Review 65 (2002), 161.
32. This “Cold War Thesis” often takes the form of a veritable myth of origin. Yet the claim 
about the temporal coincidence of the rise of retrospective politics and the end of the Cold War is not 
unanimously accepted. Antoon De Baets, for example, although accepting that 1989 was an important 
accelerator and amplifier, stresses that the genesis of the current wave of retrospective politics can be 
traced back to the stance of the Red Cross, which in 1974 in its protocols stressed the need to “search 
for the dead.” Alternatively, he argues this genesis could be traced back at least to as early as 1981, 
with the “Quinteros case” about abductions and detentions by the military in Uruguay, or 1984, with 
the creation of the CONADEP truth commission after the military dictatorship in Argentina. See 
Antoon De Baets, Responsible History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 154-163. 
33. Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, xi. 
34. Ibid., xxxiv. 
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by the International Criminal Court), by stressing how the former results from 
a moral commitment to healing, reconciliation, and restoration rather than from 
a will for revenge or retaliation and by claiming that it generally results from 
internal dynamics rather than being enforced by external powers. The origins of 
(modern) transitional justice are almost without exception linked by its supporters 
to a series of internal political transitions that started with the downfall of a series 
of military dictatorships in Latin America, which was followed by the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe and went global with the end of apartheid in South 
Africa and the decline of authoritarianism in countries all over the world.35 These 
transitions away from dictatorship or authoritarianism are typically presented as 
transitions toward liberal democracy: Samuel Huntington famously spoke about 
a “third wave” of democratization.36 Furthermore the transitions are generally 
presented as primarily the work of an elite of “democracy builders”—rather than, 
for example, resulting primarily from socioeconomic processes—who made the 
moral decision to respect human rights and transcend adversarial logics by break-
ing the cycle of vengeance and not answering violence with violence.37 
The stress on reconciliation that has become such a prominent feature of tran-
sitional justice discourse and broader retrospective politics seems another proof 
of the downfall of philosophies of history based on the Gegnerprinzip. With its 
stress on reconciliation and restorative justice rather than retributive justice and 
rancor, transitional justice discourse at first sight seems the exact opposite of the 
adversarial logic criticized by Marquard.38 
Does all of the above then mean that current retrospective politics has indeed 
finally overcome the tendency to deny responsibility for evil as it has often been 
seen to do in the progressive philosophies of history turned secular theodicies? 
Does retrospective politics’ focus on historical injustice and apparent break with 
the Gegnerprinzip signify that it no longer searches for a moral “unindictability” 
or engage in secular theodicy? Is contemporary “humanity” (if this unit[y] exists) 
thus finally acknowledging its responsibility for evil? Regrettably, I believe the 
answer is no.
35. See, for example, how this narrative plays out in one of the classics of transitional justice 
literature, Neil Kritz’s three-volume Transitional Justice (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1995). 
36. This new wave of democracy, according to Huntington, succeeds two earlier waves that took 
place after the American and French Revolutions and after the Second World War, respectively. 
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
37. Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 
(2002), 1, and Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009), 321-367.
38. Yet it should be noticed that adversarial logic in a limited sense returns in the adversarial prin-
ciple of many court cases and international tribunals (thanks to Antoon De Baets for this important 
remark). 
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RETROSPECTIVE POLITICS AND TEMPORAL “MANICHAEISM”
Rather than breaking with the practice of secular theodicy and with the search for 
moral unburdening or “unindictability,” I argue that dominant retrospective poli-
tics, against all appearances, actually tends to reproduce many of the intellectual 
mechanisms underlying older progressivist philosophies of history. Retrospective 
politics paradoxically makes claims about human emancipation and contempo-
rary humanity’s voluntary embrace of moral guilt but tends to produce the exact 
opposite effects. 
I do not posit a substantial historical continuity between earlier progressivist 
philosophies of history (for example, Hegelian idealism; Marxism) and currently 
dominant retrospective politics, however. Much like Marquard, I base my claim 
on Blumenberg’s so-called functional model of history (see note 26) and argue 
that progressivist philosophies of history and currently dominant retrospective 
politics tend to function similarly: namely, as secular theodicies. 
In contrast to many progressivist philosophies of history, dominant retro-
spective politics does not do this primarily by indentifying concrete historical 
adversaries (for example, aristocracy, bourgeois, new management) who are 
held responsible for past and present historical injustice and for obstructing “true 
humanity” from reaching a more just future. Rather than explicitly referring to 
concrete historical adversaries—except for some iconic enemies symbolizing 
absolute and timeless evil, such as Fascism or communism—it radicalizes the 
stress on a particular temporal duality in which an increasingly abstract and 
decontextualized past is represented as the container and source of all evil and 
comes to oppose the present as the true adversary (Gegner) or the true perpetra-
tor of history (Geschichtstäter). I will illustrate this tendency more elaborately 
below. Yet, as a first illustration, think of the argument of the Afrikaner member 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Wynand Malan, 
who in his dissenting minority position in the commission’s Final Report drew 
to a perverted but logical conclusion the tendency toward temporal Manichaeism 
manifest in the findings of his colleague commissioners. As becomes clear from 
the citation at the beginning of this piece, Malan did this by stating that the past 
itself should be considered the main perpetrator and that no ethical and certainly 
no legal judgments should therefore any longer be made about apartheid or any 
of its “former” perpetrators.39
Although the radicalized Evil Past cannot be compared to the human adversary 
who rules supreme and literally keeps us from addressing injustice, it functions 
just as well, or even better, as a source of moral unburdening through the alibi of 
impotency [Ohnmachtsgarantie] because “common sense” knows that what has 
been done cannot be undone and that one ought not hold successor generations 
39. South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (Cape Town, 1998), V.
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responsible for what their forefathers have done.40 The Evil Past of retrospec-
tive politics at first sight seems to have the disadvantage that, in contrast to the 
reigning adversary of progressivist philosophies of history, it cannot deliver 
an Ohnmachtsgarantie for evil and injustice happening in the present. In fact, 
however, retrospective politics actually has at its disposal a series of intellectual 
mechanisms that do help it to extend an Ohnmachtsgarantie to the present or 
at least to putatively anachronistic leftovers of the past in the present. Indeed, I 
argue that a major moral mechanism used to absolve contemporaries from the 
moral problem of present-day evil and injustice is what I call the “allochronist” 
historicization of these phenomena. “Allochronism” is the practice of symboli-
cally allocating into another time phenomena that take place in the chronological 
present.41 The increasing stress in dominant retrospective politics on the fact that 
the “past is evil,” regrettably often tends to result in the belief that this “evil is 
past” or, at least, that it is anachronistic and will become past soon. I agree with 
Robert Meister when he argues that one of the defining characteristics of cur-
rently dominant retrospective politics and even of recent human rights discourse 
in general is that it identifies itself as essentially coming after evil, and more 
specifically after the evil of the twentieth century.42 I also share Meister’s worries 
about the ethico-political effects of such an approach. As he provocatively but 
very pointedly remarks, “the cost of achieving a moral consensus that the past 
was evil is to reach a political consensus that the evil is past.”43 
By allochronically historicizing contemporary injustice and treating it in 
terms of historical discourse, a distance is created between one’s own present-
day activities and these allegedly past or anachronistic crimes. Moreover, the 
historicizing stance also enables one to portray one’s relationship to this evil in 
contemplative terms as analogous to that of the historian or the witness rather 
than of the morally more problematic position of the bystander, or worse, the 
beneficiary or accomplice.44 Although retrospective politics (through its stress 
40. This use of the “past” as a source of Ohnmachtsgarantie is not new. Marcel Gauchet considers 
the cult of an original past in the form of myths of origin as the original and most perfect form of all 
“religion” because in contrast to later polytheistic and monotheistic religious systems, the original 
past as an original script, among other things, offers a perfect and nonnegotiable possibility for the 
radical self-dispossession of human agency or freedom and thus of responsibility. Marcel Gauchet, Le 
Désenchantement du monde: Une histoire politique de la religion (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).
41. I borrow this concept from the anthropologist Johannes Fabian. Although it seems to be per-
fected by dominant retrospective politics, this allochronism is not an exclusive feature of retrospective 
politics. Fabian actually coined the term to describe an aspect of historicist ideologies that closely 
resembles the progressive philosophies of history that Marquard criticizes. Johannes Fabian, Time 
and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
42. Robert Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2012), 1. As Meister argues, this self-representation is directly related to a changed conception of evil 
itself in recent human rights discourse: “[Evil] is no longer widely understood to be a system of social 
injustice that can have ongoing structural effects, even after the structure is dismantled. Rather, evil is 
described as a time of cyclical violence that is past—or can be put in the past by defining the present 
as another time in which the evil is remembered rather than repeated” (Meister, After Evil, 25).
43. Ibid., 25.
44. History, according to Hannah Arendt, is the contemplative discipline par excellence. One 
could say historiography represents vita contemplativa in contrast to vita activa. Hannah Arendt, 
“The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,” in Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six 
Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking Press, 1968).
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on restitution) seemingly tends to break with the classical modernist vision that 
defines the past as the realm of contemplation while considering the present and 
future as the realms of intervention,45 this tendency is actually strongly tempered 
or even neutralized by a simultaneous stress on the notions of (historical) truth 
and remembrance, which, as central features of a “proper” relation to the past, are 
generally conceived of in primarily contemplative terms.
In order to further illustrate and explain these claims, it is important to show 
how dominant retrospective politics is closely related to a (liberal) post-histoire 
philosophy of history in which the relation between past and present is typically 
defined in highly dualist or quasi-Manichaeist terms. As mentioned above, the 
rise of retrospective politics largely coincided with, or at least strongly acceler-
ated since, the end of the Cold War and the period in which many in the West 
celebrated the allegedly final triumph of liberal democracy over its autocratic 
opponents. 
The link between dominant retrospective politics and liberal-democratic post-
histoire triumphalism is not just chronological but also ideological. This ideologi-
cal linkage is well documented for the field of transitional justice, which, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, was developed at a series of international conferences 
mainly sponsored by US-based non-governmental organizations.46 Whether or not 
they explicitly underwrote Francis Fukuyama’s famous claim about “The End of 
History and the Last Man,”47 most transitional justice pioneers agreed that liberal 
democracy represented the highest stage of history in political or moral terms—
certainly as an ideal—and that all transitions away from authoritarianism therefore 
would or should logically be transitions toward this type of democracy.48 
The retrospective dimensions of transitional justice were, certainly in the early 
days, mostly seen as necessary evils that were needed to safeguard the political 
transition to liberal democracy and to make sure history would not relapse into 
more primitive stages. Setting straight the injustices of the past, it could be said, 
was the burden of the Last Man living at the end of history. From its early begin-
nings, the “transitional” aspect of transitional justice therefore was generally 
given much more weight than its counterpart, “justice.” This subordination of the 
goal of retrospective justice to the goal of transition to liberal democracy can be 
seen in its most straightforward form in the work of transitologist and transitional 
justice pioneer Samuel Huntington. Before the field of transitional justice had 
received its current name, Huntington identified some of its central dilemmas 
under the label “the torturer problem”: what to do with the worst human rights 
45. See, for example, Nathan Rotenstreich, Time and Meaning in History (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1987), 21.
46. For an overview of how the field of transitional justice was formed, see Arthur, “How ‘Transi-
tions’ Reshaped Human Rights.”
47. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992). 
48. For criticisms of this premise, see Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” and Han-
nah Franzki, “Zur Kritik von transitional justice als Projekt historischer Gerechtigkeit,” Peripherie 
32, no. 125 (2012), 67-81. As David Anton Hoogenboom argues, the intellectual framework under-
pinning transitional justice was strongly influenced by the older tradition of “transitology,” which as 
a subfield of political science focused on regime changes after authoritarian rule and was unabashedly 
pro liberal democracy. David Anton Hoogenboom, “Theorizing ‘Transitional Justice.’” PhD thesis, 
University of Western Ontario, 2013. 
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offenders of the previous regime, and how to deal with the power and support 
they often still have? Although his guidelines for democratizers would not be 
endorsed by many transitional justice scholars active today, his approach is 
highly representative of the currently dominant transitional justice perspective 
in that it starts out from the underlying idea of a fundamental and problematic 
temporal dualism. When a country is confronted with the question of how to treat 
officials who blatantly violated human rights, Huntington advised prosecution 
or punishment if and only if the power balance is such that the victory of liberal 
democracy can be guaranteed. As a general rule, Huntington advises potential 
“democratizers” to “recognize that on the issue of ‘prosecute and punish vs. 
forgive and forget,’” each alternative presents grave problems, and that the least 
unsatisfactory course may well be: do not prosecute, do not punish, do not for-
give, and, above all, do not forget.49
The underlying post-histoire vision that strongly shaped transitional justice’s 
perspective explains why its focus on historical injustice—even if today it is 
increasingly considered as a goal on its own and not merely a necessary evil—
has not led to a thorough acknowledgment of responsibility for evil as our evil. 
Much as Fukuyama defended his thesis that liberal democracy represents the end 
of history primarily though a negative logic that stresses the failure, and thus the 
“pastness” or at least anachronism, of all political alternatives, transitional justice 
defends transitions to liberal democracy primarily through the negative logic of 
stressing the evil nature of the past.50 This explains why transitional justice pro-
grams seldom focus on the structural continuities between past and present and 
why their reflections on historical justice seldom lead to moral responsibility or 
blame spilling over into the present or to contemporary humanity.51 Since liberal 
democracy represents the logical and legitimate political or ethical endpoint of 
history and since the transition to this democracy is generally believed to have 
49. Huntington, The Third Wave, 231.
50. This “negative” logic in Fukuyama’s work about the anachronism of the political foes of 
liberalism was especially prominent in his original essay on the end of history thesis, which was 
published in The National Interest, where he had not yet developed his Hegelian theory about the role 
of thymos in political history; see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 
(Summer 1989), 3-18.
51. This lack of critical scrutiny of the present and the continuities between the past and the present 
were, for example, often criticized in the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation commis-
sion. South African historian Colin Bundy, for example, strongly criticized the truth commission in 
his country for this reason. According to him, the TRC focused too strongly on the strictly delineated 
period of apartheid, which it described as the “beast of the past,” while it hardly took notice of conti-
nuities with the periods before and after. Colin Bundy, “The Beast of the Past: History and the TRC,” 
in After the TRC: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, ed. W. 
James and L. van de Vijver (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2001), 9-20. Other commentators 
too deemed the strict focus of the TRC a missed chance for a more critical analysis of the “new” South 
Africa. See, for example, Jacobus Du Pisani and Kwang-Su Kim, “Establishing the Truth about the 
Apartheid Past: Historians and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” African 
Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2004), 77. This mechanism is not restricted to the TRC’s narrative, but 
seems to have become a widespread way of dealing with the legacy of apartheid in South Africa. 
Chana Teeger and Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi argue that the South African Apartheid Museum tries to 
create a consensual commemoration by consistently divorcing the (dreadful) past from the (hopeful) 
present and by resisting narrative lines that highlight the relevance of the past to present issues and 
debates. C. Teeger and V. Vinitzky-Seroussi, “Controlling for Consensus: Commemorating Apart-
heid in South Africa,” Symbolic Interaction, 30, no. 1 (2007), 57-78.
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taken place already or at least to have been initiated by the time transitional jus-
tice projects are started up, it makes little sense to pay much attention to structural 
continuities between past and present. Most certainly it is considered undesirable 
to search for inspiration in the struggle of the past, as is often done by victim and 
survivor groups.52 
This tendency of the Evil Past to legitimize the present that seems innocent and 
just in comparison, thereby supplanting critical acknowledgment of contemporary 
responsibilities, regrettably can also be found outside the field of transitional jus-
tice in broader retrospective politics and even in mainstream Western historical 
culture in general. Historians have often complained about the way in which the 
past increasingly becomes the object of a moralistic Historia horesco referens53 and 
how this leads to a double moral standard in which the overburdening of the past 
with all the evil of the world ultimately serves to morally legitimize the present. 
David Lowenthal, for example, complains that although the past wasn’t regarded 
very highly during the heyday of progressivist ideologies, today it is under assault 
in a different and much more moralistic way, because: “Unlike Futurists and Mod-
ernists we do not reprobate the past’s material and aesthetic achievements; quite to 
the contrary, we cherish them. Instead, we condemn precursors’ wicked misdeeds 
and immoral institutions. Our racist, sexist, elitist forebears are anathematized as 
cruel and avaricious hierarchs, and hypocrites to boot.”54
The moral repudiation of the past can indeed sometimes take grotesque propor-
tions whereby entire periods become stamped as Evil Past. The entire twentieth 
century, for example, as Charles Maier remarks, has been “consigned” to history, 
by intellectuals and the larger public alike, as a dark age of moral atrocity and 
absolute evil, or even simply, as Isaiah Berlin once put it, as “the worst century 
there has ever been.”55 As Tiffany Jenkins argues, the tendency to “elevate” or 
“showcase” the darkest sides of mankind’s history also manifests itself in many 
memorial museums around the world, which she therefore describes as “cabinets 
of misery.”56
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As I mentioned above, the post-histoire ideology underlying dominant retro-
spective politics leads to a sort of temporal Manichaeism that can obscure the 
52. As Meister remarks, transitional justice and even recent human rights discourse in general 
increasingly turns against any notion of (revolutionary) struggle, even the notion of “justice-as-strug-
gle” on which older post-1789 human rights discourse was based, and replaces this with a belief in 
the “universal innocence of past victims.” Meister, After Evil, ix. 
53. Lagrou, “De l’histoire du temps présent à l’histoire des autres,” 13.
54. David Lowenthal, “The Past Made Present,” Historically Speaking 13, no. 4. (2012), 2-6 , 4. 
55. Charles Maier claims: “For Western intellectuals, the twentieth century does not refer primar-
ily to a strictly chronological unit. Rather, it constitutes a moral epoch, a dark historical passage 
characterized by ideological conflict, dehumanization, wholesale political killing, unmeasured cruelty 
to civilians in war, and genocide.” Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: 
Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000), 807-831. 
Berlin is cited on page 812.
56. Tiffany Jenkins, “Memorial Museums: Cabinets of Misery,” Spiked Culture (May 19, 2005). 
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/1044#.VBGLvPmSwZ0 (accessed February 20, 2015).
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structural continuities between the chronological past and the chronological 
present and that, by means of its own version of Ohnmachtsgarantie, protects 
contemporary humanity from moral responsibility and blame leaking from the 
past into the present. Yet, as I noted, this same ideology also includes intellectual 
mechanics that extend this Ohnmachtsgarantie to evil and injustice happening in 
the (chronological) present. It does this by means of a specific politics of time 
that (performatively) historicizes parts of the chronological present on the basis 
of what one could call “typological time.”57 
Whoever studies Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis, for example, will notice 
that it is based at least as much on claims that posit the ideal or typological “past-
ness” of alternative forms of political rule to liberal democracy, such as theocracy 
or military dictatorship or fascism and communism, as on empirical proofs of 
the actual substantial and chronological demise or pastness of these systems of 
rule.58 Similarly, I have argued in previous publications that transitional justice 
claims about democratic victories and the overcoming of Evil Pasts are often 
based largely not on an observation of the actual pastness of this evil but on a 
politics of time that actively or “performatively” treats as past or anachronistic 
all those phenomena that do not conform to the liberal-democratic ideal, which 
is considered fully contemporaneous.59 This type of performative allochronism 
(active allocation in typological or symbolic time) of undesirable phenomena and 
persons in the chronological present can, for example, be found in truth commis-
sions, which are at the forefront of retrospective politics. Referring to the cases 
of South Africa and Sierra Leone, for example, I argued that in these countries 
the political, social, and cultural present became so strongly defined around the 
values of forgiveness and reconciliation that those people (victims and survivors 
as well as perpetrators) who were unwilling or unable to forgive tend to be seen as 
living anachronisms refusing to be contemporaneous with the rest of the nation. 
57. Fabian, Time and the Other. 
58. Fukuyama often makes use of an allochronist discourse when dealing with these alternative 
ideologies and political systems, calling them, for example, “primitive,” “stuck in history,” “tradi-
tional,” or “anachronistic.” Take, for example, the following passage about the historical status of 
communism: “China, of course, continues to be ruled by a communist government, as do Cuba, North 
Korea, and Vietnam. But . . . those who call themselves communist now find themselves fighting 
continuous rearguard actions to preserve something of their former position and power. Communists 
now find themselves in the unenviable position of defending an old and reactionary social order 
whose time has long since passed, like the monarchists who managed to survive into the twentieth 
century.” Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 35-36. Whenever Fukuyama encounters 
examples of cases where these ideological alternatives seem all too vital to declare them dead and 
gone, Fukuyama pulls the idealist card and questions whether these cases have any universal historical 
importance. Fukuyama in his original essay, for example, notoriously claimed that for the purpose of 
proving his thesis, “it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina 
Faso, for we are interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of 
mankind.” Fukuyama, “The End of History?”
59. Berber Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-sponsored Violence: Time and Justice (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), and Berber Bevernage, “Writing the Past Out of the Present: History and 
the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice, History Workshop Journal 69, no. 1 (2010), 111-131. I 
recently felt confirmed in my conviction about the pervasiveness of this mechanism of performative 
allochronism and the mechanism of the “past is evil/evil is past”-inversion by reading Meister’s 
impressive book on what he calls the politics of human rights discourse. See Meister, After Evil. 
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Once one comes to identify this moral mechanism, one can find many exam-
ples of this strategy that not only tends to conceive of the past as evil but also 
turns this reasoning around and tends to historicize or “anachronize” evil when-
ever it encounters it. Often this mechanism is quite innocent. Take, for example, 
the Belgian campaign against littering that paradoxically tries to relegate to the 
past this clearly very contemporary problem by putting up posters claiming that 
“littering is no longer of this time” [“Zwerfvuil is niet meer van deze tijd”].60 Or 
take the example of former French president Sarkozy, who in 2010 visited the vil-
lage L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer that was heavily damaged by a storm and who immedi-
ately historicized this calamity and accordingly took a distancing, contemplative 
stance by exclaiming that this is “unacceptable” in “the twenty-first century” and 
by demanding an inquiry delivering “full clarity.”61 A less innocent example of 
this mechanism is given by Paul Ricoeur, who, referring to the fate of Holocaust-
survivor testimonies, writes, “so inadmissible to the ordinary understanding of 
their contemporaries appear the extraordinary events on which they report, and 
which therefore look even more ‘bygone’ than any and all abolished past, that the 
voices of these witnesses are often inaudible—sometimes they die of the incom-
prehension they encounter.”62 Or take the example given by Inés Vázquez, an 
Argentine intellectual connected to the Madres de Plaza de Mayo. She complains 
that the contemplative and historicizing discourse of remembrance has become 
so influential that the demand for remembrance appears immediately, practically 
attached to crimes, and that human rights activists often start to “remember” even 
in situations where “temporal logic” clearly demands “perception and action.” 
Vázquez illustrates her claims by narrating the case of the Argentine reporter 
José Luis Cabezas, who was murdered on Sunday, January 25, 1996, and for 
whom protesters two days later were already shouting, “let’s not forget about 
Cabezas.”63 Or take the implicit example of CNN, compelled to explicitly name 
its anti-slavery project “Ending Modern-day Slavery” in order to fight the stub-
born, common habit of associating slavery exclusively with the Evil Past.64
60. A similar, but clearly more self-conscious, use of this technique of performative allochronism 
was recently used in another advertising campaign, this time in one of Belgium’s major papers, on 
the topic of female circumcision. Against an empty white background the ad centrally features the 
word “vrouwenbesnijdenwas” (transliterated “circumcizingwomenwas”). At the bottom of the ad a 
smaller text frame adds some extra explanation under the slogan “Make female circumcision past 
tense” (“Maak vrouwenbesnijdenis verleden tijd”).
61. Website of Flemish Radio and Television, De redactie.be (March 1, 2010). 
62. Paul Ricoeur, “Temporal Distance and Death in History,” in Gadamer’s Century: Essays in 
Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2002), 245.
63. Ines Vázquez, “Aspectos de Memoria y Cultura en la Argentina postdictatorial,” in Un país. 
30 años. El pañuelo sigue haciendo historia, ed. I. Vázquez and K. Downie (Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo, 2006), 201-217. [my translation]
64. See http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/ (accessed February 23, 2015). Francis 
Fukuyama describes how the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1910-11 under the heading of “torture,” 
explained that “the whole subject is one of only historical interest as far as Europe is concerned.” 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 4.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD ALTERNATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY
Having identified some of the problems plaguing dominant retrospective politics, 
what alternative can be proposed? Some would undoubtedly recommend simply 
quitting the project of historical justice and leaving the past for what it is or even 
trying to forget about its evils. This advice is not always based on cynical motives 
and is sometimes given out of a genuine interest in emancipation and justice or at 
least conflict resolution and reconciliation.65
Yet I do not believe that abandoning the project of historical justice is a 
desirable or necessary solution to the problems of current (post-utopian or even 
post-political) politics in general or, more specifically, the problems of a histori-
cal culture threatening to turn into a “liturgy celebrating the superiority of the 
present”66—even if these problems are undeniably very real. 
The problem with dominant retrospective politics—its anti-utopian character 
and its tendency to create a double standard—should not be situated in the fact 
that it focuses on the past per se, but rather should be related to a specific under-
lying philosophy of history that is based on a specific antinomic or even dualist 
vision of temporality that opposes the past to the present and the future and tends 
to be used for a specific function: that of a secular theodicy that exculpates us 
contemporaries in relation to chronologically past as well as chronologically 
present evils and injustice. As I have argued by referring to the work of Odo Mar-
quard, simply substituting retrospective politics for progressive politics cannot be 
the solution because a similar exculpatory mechanism is also found in progressiv-
ist philosophies of history, which for this purpose make use of a temporal dualism 
as well (one opposing past and present to the future). 
A radical break with these types of exculpatory mechanisms, then, can only 
be achieved if we break with that which both dominant retrospective politics and 
(totalitarian) progressivist politics have in common: their specific concept of his-
torical time that conceives of the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future 
in antinomic or even “dualist” terms and treats them as discrete and mutually 
exclusive entities. What is needed is a radically different philosophy of history 
65. Jean Bethke Elshtain, for example, defends resorting to a “knowing forgetting” in situations 
where nations or groups are held hostage to a burdened past and are in great need of the “drama of 
forgiveness.” “People,” she writes, “are very fond of citing Santayana’s claim that those who don’t 
know their history are doomed to repeat it. But perhaps the reverse is more likely, namely, that it is 
those who know their history too well who are doomed to repetition.” Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Politics 
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that rethinks historical temporality in such a way that it no longer lends itself to 
these types of antinomic or dualist figures of thought. Only on this basis can we 
create a more substantial and inclusive project of historical justice that does not 
force us to choose between retrospective justice, on the one hand, and justice in 
the present or the future, on the other, but makes these reinforce each other.
I do not have the space here to discuss in detail the quest for such an alternative 
philosophy of history. In previous publications I have argued that several think-
ers—Louis Althusser, Ernst Bloch, Johannes Fabian, but most notably Jacques 
Derrida with his notion of “spectrality”—have proposed alternative ways of 
thinking about history and temporality that can offer good starting points for 
such a quest.67 Yet a good “practical” starting point for this quest is to look at the 
alternative visions of historical time that many victims’ and survivors’ groups 
hold. Their visions are not at all identical to that of the dominant retrospective 
politics. A common feature of groups such as the Argentine Madres de Plaza de 
Mayo, the South African Khulumani Support Group, groups in Sierra Leone, or 
even groups in China is that they often do combine their retrospective gaze with 
present- and future-focused projects of justice (for example, redistributive jus-
tice) and that they therefore resist dualist visions of temporality and even notions 
of temporal distance. 
The South African Khulumani Support group states in one of its manifestoes, 
“victims and survivors declare the past to be in the present.”68 This idea fits very 
well with the basic philosophy of history of, for example, the Argentine Madres, 
who after more than thirty years still claim that the disappearance of their chil-
dren does not belong to the past. In a more complex way it also relates to the 
vision of history of rural groups in China, which, according to anthropologist 
Erik Mueggler, responded to the violence of the Cultural Revolution and the 
Great Leap Forward by re-engaging with forms of ancestor-worship that openly 
rebelled against the linear progressive time coming from Beijing.69
The stance of these victims’ groups seems to make them especially vulnerable 
to the mechanism of what I called allochronist historicization, but actually, if suc-
cessful, it can also subvert this mechanism by rejecting the idea of past, present, 
and future as discrete and mutually exclusive categories. Following the lead of 
these activist groups, I have argued that philosophers of history should break with 
the idea of the fully contemporaneous present and instead embrace that of radical 
noncontemporaneity or noncoevalness.70 This idea is radical because, if consis-
tently thought through, it forces us to break with the idea of past, present, and 
future as separate ontological unities—rather than just chronological demarca-
tions. It is also radical because it forces us to break with something that is valued 
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very dearly by many progressive intellectuals: namely, the idea that the basis of 
critical thought is to ask “what time” we are living in, to think the “present” and 
“actuality” or the injunction to “Always historicize,”71 to quote Fredric Jameson. 
Once one breaks with the idea of past, present, and future as discrete ontological 
entities and embraces the idea of radical noncontemporaneity, one can indeed no 
longer say what is truly “of this time,” what is truly progressive and pointing to 
the future, or what really belongs to the past and whose defense is thus conserva-
tive or even reactionary. 
Yet I am convinced that the idea does not at all prevent us from reflecting criti-
cally on society. On the contrary: Rather than try to say what time it is, one has 
to focus on the active and dynamic process of “timing” or “temporalization.” A 
critical analysis of the politics of time should focus on how groups performatively 
create hegemonic “contemporaneities” (for example, the modern West as truly 
contemporaneous, as representing the contemporary72) and how they try to stamp 
other groups and phenomena as future or past. Such an analysis should also focus 
on how hegemonic and counter-hegemonic groups try to enforce closure upon or 
keep alive certain spaces of experience and how they try to open up or foreclose 
certain horizons of expectation (to use Koselleck’s terminology). In the words of 
Jacques Rancière, we have to analyze how time and, more specifically, the separa-
tions between past and present are used as a “principle of impossibility.”73 More-
over, an embrace of radical noncontemporaneity has the advantage that we can 
find utopian potential in what is commonly considered to be the future, the pres-
ent, and the past. In this vision, retrospective politics indeed does not at all need to 
oppose emancipatory or utopian politics but can reinforce and reinvigorate them. 
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